North Waziristan require thorough preparations

North Waziristan require thorough preparations

Asif Haroon Raja

After two years and seven months of sustained pressure, the
US seems to have finally succeeded in cornering Pakistan and making it agree to
launch an operation in North Waziristan (NW). Pak Army has been reluctant to do
so because of its genuine constraints. Notwithstanding the numerous
disadvantages of the intended operation which I have been enumerating in my
articles, it cannot be ignored that NW now houses all sorts of
anti-state terrorist
groups, most on the payroll of foreign agencies. These include, TTP, Punjabi
Taliban, remnants of al-Qaeda, elements of Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,
Khurasan group, Asian Tigers, Jaish-e-Muhammad, late Ilyas Kashmiri
group and some
others. Some say there are over thirty groups in NW. Most of the groups have
got affiliated with TTP or al-Qaeda. All high profile terrorist attacks since
2010 have emanated from NW. Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Sirajuddin-Badruddin Haqqani
brothers or for that matter Mullah Omar based in Kandahar have little control
over them but are sympathetic towards TTP. These groups operate for
money only or in
revenge for having been denied Jihad in Kashmir. Some harbor the dream
of an Islamic
caliphate while some are anti-Shia groups. Al-Qaeda has its own set of
grievances against Pakistan. The US is least interested in anti-Pakistan
terrorist groups but is highly concerned about Haqqani network (HN), a potent
faction of Afghan Taliban movement, which it claims is responsible
for its failure
in Afghanistan. The US is hiding its failures behind HN and Pakistan and is
punishing Pakistan. Attacks on GHQ, Mehran naval base, ISI setups, Naval
College, FIA HQ, and now on Kamra airbase were all CIA-RAW sponsored and
executed by TTP – an extension of CIA.

Now that an operation seems inevitable, going by the dictum
of 'sweat saves blood', there is a need to carryout thorough
preparations. Terrain
in NW is extremely rugged and suited for guerrilla operations. Most villages in
NW are situated on higher ground and can be easily converted into strong points
and ambush sites. Few men positioned at vantage points can keep a battalion
size force at length for a considerable length of time. The militants well
trained in the art of guerrilla war and having learnt lessons from earlier
conflicts would avoid pitched battles and instead would resort to surprise
night raids, suicide attacks and maximum use of IEDs. But I wonder, after
having learnt about the intended operation, the wanted groups as well as the
friendly groups would wait for the Army to pounce upon them and get killed or
would prefer to melt away.

Miranshah and Mir Ali being the most populous towns in NW and
hub of economic and smuggling activities provides best hiding places to the
militant groups. All wanted groups are residing in these towns and locals are
sympathetic to them. Having got merged with the local populace, they would try
their best to dissuade the locals to shift to camps so that they do not get
denied of human shields during the conflict. The military is having
its own fortified
camp and the soldiers seldom visit the two markets without adequate protection.
No vehicular move takes place without road clearance. If an operation is to be
launched against these towns and areas closer to Khost border, the civil
population will have to be displaced and housed in camps as was the practice in
the past. The two towns are likely to get substantially damaged and would
require heavy finances to rebuild them. While the rehabilitation and rebuilding
of destroyed NW and healing the injured feelings of the affected people would
take a very long time, it will take no time for the US to bounce back and
express its dissatisfaction over the outcome and asking Pakistan to do more.

In my view our intelligence coverage in whole of FATA is
weak. The burden of intelligence collection is borne by the deployed units
which have limited means. Had our intelligence network been strong and
effective, it would not have allowed so many anti-Pakistan groups to mushroom
in NW. It should have nabbed the teams receiving training in NW for the
impending attack, or in the forward operating bases in the vicinity of target
area, where they collected arms and from where they carried out reconnaissance.
Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, FIA, CID, and Special Police need
to coordinate their internal intelligence activities, while the ISI should
focus on foreign agencies.

In order to cure this grey area, there is a need to establish
full fledged intelligence HQ under Maj Gen with its tentacles located in each
tribal agency and troubled settled regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the wake
of planned operation, maximum intelligence assets should be concentrated in NW
to sift friend from foe. Double dealers, fence sitters, neutrals and
pro-Pakistan elements must be identified, won over and protected. Those on the
payroll of foreign agencies must be marked. Their sources of funding and supply
routes and hiding places should be traced. This preliminary exercise
of sanitization
is necessary to prepare a level ground for a successful operation.

Military Operations Directorate should assess whether the
concept of enter-capture-hold-build and transfer applied in Swat and SW will be
applicable in NW since the latter is in occupation of over a division sized
force since long. It should be seen whether old pattern of multi-pronged
attacks would be feasible or a change is required. In Swat, the enemy was
Fazlullah led Taliban fighting on their home ground and there were no
pro-government militant groups. In Bajaur Maulvi Faqir led Taliban fought the
Frontier Corps on their home ground. In SW, the military faced the main base of
TTP led by Hakimullah Mehsud on their home ground, while Maulvi Nazir group
stayed neutral and his area of influence was used as the operational base by
the Army. Hakimullah had urged Gul Bahadur to join his battle and he
seemed inclined
to come to his aid. When pressed by
security forces to honor his peace deal, he quipped, 'What is the guarantee
that he will not be the next target'? Reportedly, he restrained himself only
when he was assured that no military operation would be undertaken in NW. The
Army could conduct a three pronged offensive in SW from three directions
because of cooperation of Nazir and Bahadur, both not part of TTP.

In case of NW, there will be a mix of friendly and unfriendly
militant groups with no clear cut demarcation. TTP will be the main enemy which
will be fighting the battle on someone else's ground. Notwithstanding that the
TTP is dispersed, weakened and tactically on the defensive in FATA after its
ouster from SW in 2009, however, strategically it is still on the offensive
since it retains the ability to carry out small scale strikes against most
sensitive and hardened targets at will anywhere in Pakistan. Attack on
Kamra airbase
is the recent example. It draws strength from its affiliated groups and Punjabi
Taliban that are hitting targets in cities of Punjab. Foreign funding
and availability
of secure bases in Kunar and Nuristan has bolstered the strength of TTP from
where Fazlullah's fighters have kept Bajaur, Mehmand, Dir and Chitral turbulent.
It has its mini-bases in upper Orakzai Agency, central Kurram Agency,
Shawal valley
connecting NW with SW, Tirah and Dara Adam Khel (DAK). These five areas can
reinforce or influence the battle in NW. Death of Mullah Dadullah who had
replaced Maulvi Faqir in Bajaur and Tariq Afridi heading Taliban chapter in DAK
are significant, but TTP is quick in finding replacements.

The dominating Othmanzai Wazir tribe led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur
is tied to peace treaty with security forces since August 2008. Sirajuddin
Haqqani's group is also friendly and has never fired upon security troops. The
TTP has challenged the Army and threatened that it will resist with
full force including
its suicidal Fidai squads. It will however not be enjoying home ground
advantage. Its rank and file is dispersed and leadership is in hiding.
Hakimullah Mehsud will try to collect them together and also task DAK Taliban
under a new commander to disrupt main supply route of Kohat-Bannu.
Hakimullah must
also be convincing Gul Bahadur and Sirajuddin to join hands with him and fight
the decisive battle jointly. Bahadur is already highly bitter over drone
attacks and feels the government is doing little to stop this menace. Hakimullah
must also be trying to persuade Maulvi Nazir to shelve peace treaty and pick up
arms against the troops deployed in SW and prevent them from launching a pincer
along Ladha-Makeen-Razmak axis or from reinforcing NW garrison. CIA and RAW on
their part must be playing their dirty tricks since it is to their advantage if
anti-US groups turn their guns towards Pak security forces and make the task of
ISAF easier.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Sirajuddin and Maulvi Nazir should be
convinced to detach themselves from anti-Pakistan groups and to help
in motivating
the people to cooperate with the military. Without their intimate cooperation
and public support, the intended operation may not fetch desired
results. Greater
number of Lashkars armed with sophisticated weapons should be activated. Escape
routes to Afghanistan should be cordoned off to prevent TTP members from
fleeing to Afghanistan and activating another sanctuary in neighboring Afghan
province. Reinforcement routes from adjacent agencies should also be
blocked. Media
cell should be activated to show the ugly face of the terrorists involved in
heinous crimes and anti-Islamic practices and to depict the soldiers as good
Muslims and friends of patriotic people. Wrongful projection of soldiers as
infidels and on the payroll of USA by TTP leaders should be countered. Psy
warfare should be launched to win public support and to strike terror into the
hearts of militants. Full pressure should be exerted on USA to stop
counterproductive
drone attacks and steps taken to isolate TTP. Proper camps should be set up in
advance with adequate facilities to house displaced persons. Those deciding to
stay behind should act as ears and eyes of the Army rather than the
militants. Relief
and rehabilitation program should be readied in advance.

Commanding officers should be chosen with due care and only
those units that have gained sufficient experience in low intensity
conflict should
be selected for the operation. All combat soldiers to be provided life jackets
and night vision goggles and logistics requirements meticulously
worked out. Communication
security and wireless/telephone discipline should be ensured, while
conversation of foes monitored. Operation should be intelligence guided,
selective and targeted and short in duration. There should be bare minimum
collateral damage to civilians since civilian casualties might impel Gul Bahadur
to change sides. We must not forget the US-western media war duly supplemented
by Asma Jahangir and her types accusing our soldiers of human rights violations
in Swat after Operation Rah-e-Raast. A video showing soldiers gunning down
captives was released. The case has yet
not been closed.

If the US thinks that terrorism in Af-Pak region will get eliminated
with the launching of an operation in NW, or its defeat in Afghanistan will get
converted into victory, it is sadly mistaken. The intended operation will give
a reason to all the militant groups in Pakistan to join hands with Afghan
Taliban to fight conjointly rather than fighting in separate compartments or
staying neutral. The US intentions can be gauged from the fact that on one hand
it is pressing Pakistan to mount an operation against HN, and on the other it
is offering to hand over control of Paktia, Khost and Paktika provinces to HN if
it desists from attacking American forces in Afghanistan. This offer is yet
another proof of America's duality and an indication that it is
fighting this war
to serve its own interests only and cares two hoots for Pakistan's interests. In
the backdrop of hidden designs of the US to build a unified militant front
against Pakistan, why shouldn't we turn the tables on USA? Although it has
dangerous repercussions, but in the face of the dice loaded heavily in our
disfavor, it is a food for thought for our military planners.

I have a hunch that after NW; another venue would be propped
up for a military operation. Already reports are in circulation that Punjabi
Taliban feeling neglected in NW have started shifting to Multan and it is
speculated that Multan region will be the next battleground. We also
must not forget that once the ISAF
departs, bulk of the weight of terrorism will fall upon Pakistan. I therefore
do not foresee war on terror coming to an end in the foreseeable future.

The writer is a retired Brig; a war veteran, freelance
defence analyst and columnist. Email: asifharoon7751@yahoo.com




--
*Shahzad Shameem*

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ENGLISH Documents" group.
To post to this group, send email to englishdocuments@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to englishdocuments+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/englishdocuments?hl=en.